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ABSTRACT
The paper begins with presentation ofa methodology for computing rental
costs of capital under any tax regime.Tax law over the 1980—84 period is
specified and the provisions of theTreasury and Administration tax reform
proposals and HR 3838 are described. A model is thenconstructed to allow
calculation of the impact of changes in taxregimes and/or expected inflation on
interest rates and the allocation of realcapital. The model allocates a fixed
private capital stock among various classes ofnonresidential and residential
capital, depending upon the rental costs for thecapital components, the price
elasticities of demand with respect to therental costs, and the elasticities of
homeownership with respect to the cost ofowning versus renting. The interest
rate adjusts in response to tax/inflationchanges so as to maintain the
aggregate demand for capital at this initial level.The model is employed to
deduce the efficiency of the allocationof real capital under various tax
regimes at different inflation rates.
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Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in thel980s
Patric H. Henc3ershott
Three tax bills were enacted in thefirst half of the 1980s: the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, theTax Equity and Fiscal ResponsibilityAct
of 1982, and the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984. Moreover-, major tax reform
proposals, most notably the Noventher 1984Treasury plan and the May 1985
Administration plan, have been advanced forimplementation in the second half
of this decade and the U.S. House
of Representatives passed a reform billin
December 1985. The passed orproposed tax changes have altered or would
significantly affect both the overall taxationof capital and taxation in
different uses. As a result,changes in interest rates, homeownership,and
investment in various types ofcapital have or would probably be induced.The
nture and extent of thesechanges are the subjects of thispaper.
The method of analysis is theconstruction and manipulation of a
relatively small simulation model. Theprincipal features of the model are the
dependencies of the demands for varioustypes of capital on their gross (of
depreciation) user costs of capital and ofthe user costs on tax parameters and
interest rates. Special emphasis isplaced on the housing sector where
households at six different income levelsmake tenure and quantity_demanded
decisions. Finally, the level oftaxable interest rates is determinedby
equality between the total 'demand forcapital and the existing capital stock.
The model is first used to simulatethe 1981—82 tax changes.1 The
implied effects of the tax legislation
on interest rates, homeownership, and
capital allocation are then compared withobserved changes in the 1981—84
period. The model implications are atleast roughly consistent with observed—2—
events. The model is then employed to simulate the impacts of the Treasury and
Administration tax proposals and the House bill. The proposals are analyzed in
a five percent inflation world; the inflation neutrality of current law and
the reform proposals ar.e compared; and efficiency losses due to misallocation
of capital are computed for the various tax regimes.
I. Investment Hurdle Rates or User Costs
General Considerations
As is well known (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967) ,thedecision to invest
depends on whether the present value of the expected revenue from investment
exceeds the supply price of capital, and on marginal investments the two will





whereis the business tax rate, p is the gross marginal product of capital,
r is the real after—tax financing rate, d is the economic depreciation rate,
Tisthe concurrent equivalent tax rate on inflationary gains, ir is the
expected inflation rate, and k is the investment tax credit.2 In general, z
the present value of the streaii of tax depreciation allowances,
TAXDEPt.
obtained by discounting the stream of depreciation allowances by the required
nominal after—tax financing rate; taking into account the reduction in
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whereN is the depreciation period of theasset. The right side of equation
(1) is the "investment hurdle rate orrental user cost for a particular asset.
The lower the user cost, thegreater will be production of the asset, and the
lower will be the productivity of themarginal investment (p)
In a neutral' tax system, the netuser and thus net marginal
productivities (p —d)would be the same for all equally—riskyassets. This
can be achieved in a variety ofways. For example, with k =0, =0and
either z =1——expensing——or=0,then p —d=r.If the r's were equal
for all assets, the tax system would beneutral across them. Alternatively,
with k =0, =0and z =d/(r+ d) ——taxdepreciation equal to economic
depreciation, then p —d=r/(l—t).If the r's and the r's were the same for
all assets, then the system would also beneutral. Because the I'S are zero
for owner—occupied housing,expensing for depreciable assets (and the
nondeductibility of property taxes onowner—occupied housing) would lead to tax
ndutraiity ——assumingequal r's ——butsetting tax depreciation equal to
economic depreciation would not.3
Assuming that firms use a fixed fraction ofdebt, b, for financing all
investments, the real after—tax financing ratecan be expressed as
r =[b(l—8t)i+ (1—b) (l—yT)e —i]/(l÷), (3)
where 8 and y, respectively, are theportions of interest and equity returns
that are deductible at the businesslevel, and e is the required nominal return
to investors. (Currently 6 =1and y =0.)Firms will choose the b at which
the marginal costs of debt andequity, including contracting and bankruptcy
costs, are equal. (Because this marginal cost is
unknown, average values of i
and e are used in the calculation ofr.)—4—
Portfolio equilibrium of investors requires that
(l—T )e =(1—x)i+ 6, (4) e
where T is the rate at which equity returns are taxed at the personal level,
x is the relevant tax rate for taxable interest (the lower of the personal tax
rate and that implicit in tax—exempt yields) ,and6 is the risk premium
required on equity investments. For all investments except owner—occupied
housing of low and middle income households, x is the tax rate implicit in
tax—exempt yields x. Substituting (4) into (3) ,thereal after—tax financing
rate for capital other than owner—occupied housing is:
(l—x )i + 6
r =[b(l—i)i+ (1—b) (l—yT)
e —uJ/(l+). (3') 1—i
e
If ly were equal to i (which would be true if y =T=0)and x =6T,r e • e e
would equal I(l—t)i—+ 6(1—b) ]/(l+) for all assets. Further, if all
interest expense were deductible at the same rate and all investments were
equally risky, all r's would be equal.
For corporations, T depends on the taxation of dividends and capital
gains and the division of equity raised between new issues and retained
earnings (Auerbach, 1979) .Moregenerally,
T flT + (l—fl)t , (5) e dlv cg
where n is the proportion of equity funds raised by new issues, andTd. and
Tcg respectively, are the effective tax rates on dividends and equity capital
gains. In general, T =r./2 and -t=(l—exclu)t./4, where r.is the div im cg im
effective maximum tax rate on personal interest and exclu is the statutory—5—
capital gains exclusion. The divisionsby 2 and 4 allow for tax deferral and
avoidance activities. An n of 0.1 isassumed; as a result, is relatively
low (O.l4T. under current law).For noncorporate businesses (including
households investing inowner—occupied housing), T equals 0.
Empirically, the tax rate implicit intax—exempt yields varies with the
maturity of the security. For short—term taxexempts, the ratio of prime grade
tax—exempt to risk—free taxable yields has notdeviated far from unity less the
corporate tax rate or roughly U.S. Forten—year bonds, which are more relevant
for the long—term investmentsbeing analyzed, the ratio has been closer to0.7.
The implicit tax rate of 0.3, ratherthan the federal tax rate of 0.46(the
State and local tax rate is not relevantif corporations invest in theirown
jurisdictions), reflects a number of factors,but the most important is likely
the tax saving from optimally
trading bonds (e.g., taking capital losses and
deferring capital gains).4 This isespecially important because high
tiansactions costs virtually eliminateany gains from trading municipal bonds.
The tax rate implicit in long—term
tax—exempt yields is assumed to be given by:
Xe =(O.3)Tfr (6)
where is the federal corporate tax rateand the 0.3 measures the gains from
optimal trading.
All interest expense is not deductibleat the same rate, the clearest
example being owner_occupij housing. Becausethis asset is held by households
with a wide range of income subjectto the full array of marginalpersonal tax
rates, the tax rates at which interest isdeductible (and at which equity the
owner has in the house would have been taxedhad the household rented)vary
across households.5 More generally, the realafter—tax financing rate for the
jth household is—6—
r.[b.(l—i)i + (1—b,) (l—x)i —u+ + ). (7)
J J J 3 :i 3
The tax rate applicable to own equity investment, x.. is defined as the minimum
of the tax rate paid on the last dollar of taxable interest earned, ST., or
that implicit in tax—exempt yields, Xe•
For all investments other than real estate, b =1/3.For real estate
investments other than owner—occupied housing, b =2/3.This assumption is
consistent with available data on large—scale (over 50 unit) rental projects,
which probably accounted for over two—thirds of the rental units constructed in
the 1970s.6 The data in Table 1 indicate that ownership of these properties
has shifted sharply from corporations to partnerships over the past two decades
(the vast majority of additions to the stock have certainly been owned by
partnerships) ,mostof these properties have mortgages (97 percent of those
owned by partnerships in 1980), and the initial loan—to—value ratio on the 81
prcent of properties with a first mortgage at time of purchase is 87 percent.
In 1970, the median loan—to—value ratio was 67 percent. The median was only 53
percent in early 1981, when mortgage rates were at historic highs and terms had
been quite unfavorable for refinancing for three years. The two—thirds ratio
is a reasonable approximation for a present—value, weighted average loan—to—
value ratio in normal times.
For owner—occupied housing, we vary b. depending on the relative
attractiveness of debt and equity financing. More specifically,
(0.667 if x.
b. (8)
(o.85 if x. <i.
By our definitions, x. cannot exceed 1.. While these ratios far exceed the
0.33 to 0.4 average economy—wide ratio observed for owner—occupied housing,
the observed ratio is heavily influenced by older owning households who have
repaid their mortgages and are relatively insensitive to housing rental costs—8—
The 1981 Tax Act also cut the maximum federal tax rates, from 0.48 to
0.46 for corporations and from 0.7 to 0.5 for households. Weassume that the
marginal noncorporate investor was in the 54 percent bracket in 1980 (at
roughly the same real income level at which the 49 percent tax rate applied in
1985) .Theincome tax rates in Table 3 presume a 0.06 state and local tax rate
deductible at the federal level.
The personal tax rates on real corporate equity returns follow from
equation (5) and the surrounding discussion, given a capital gains exclusion of
0.6 (0.0 under the Treasury plan, 0.5 under the Administrationplan and 0.42 in
the House bill) .Thetax rate implicit in tax—exempt yields follows from
equation (6). Finally, the inflation tax, ,is0.7t on inventories because
FIFO accounting is used for 70 percent of inventories and iseffectively zero
for other assets.
The Treasury plan attempted to neutralize the taxsystem for inflation by
iYidexing everything. Only real capital gains, including thoseon inventories,
would be taxed (r =0);depreciationwould be on a replacement, rather than
historic, cost basis; and only the "real" part of interestexpense would be
all properties except owner—occupied
exclusion would reduce discrepancies
noncorporate investments.
taxed and could be deducted)0 The Treasury plan alsoattempted to tax all
assets and business forms (except owner—occupied housing)equally. To this
end, tax depreciation for each depreciable asset wouldequal the Treasury's
best estimate of true economic depreciation; the investmenttax credit would
be dropped; real capital gains would be taxedat the regular income tax rate;
and half of corporate dividends would be deductibleat the corporate level.
The indexation of inventory gains, the removal of thetax credit, and the
proposed tax depreciation treatment would result in p—dequaling r/(l—T) for
housing, and the partial dividend
between the r's for corporate and—7--
(see below)] Households under forty use far more debt (the average loan—to—
value ratio for first—time homebuyers in 1984 was 87 percent) and often make
quite long—term housing decisions. It is the decisions of such households that
we are attempting to model, and their present—value, weighted—average, loan—
to—value ratio is probably near two—thirds.
Based upon Ibbotson—Sinquefield calculations, we assumefor corporate
equities is 0.075, and thus the risk premium for corporate assets, which have a
one—third loan—to—value ratio, is (l—b)J0.05. The risk premium for
depreciable real estate investors in properties with roughly 0.80 initial
loan—to—value ratios is also about 0.075.8 Because these real—estate assets
have a mean loan—to—value ratio of two—thirds (initial ratio of near 80
percent) ,theirrisk premium is only 0.025. For owner—occupied housing, a
premium of 0.01 is assumed. This relatively low premium is consistent with
owners having certainty with regard to their "vacancy" and "breakage" rates
afid thus greater certainty with respect to their net operating incomes than is
the case with rental properties.
Tax Parameters
Tables 2 and 3 list the important business tax parameters under the laws
existing in 1980 and 1981—85, in the proposed Treasury and Administration tax
plans and in H.R. 3838 passed in December 1985. The 1981 Tax Act roughly
halved depreciation tax lives and lowered the percentage of straight line for
equipment and utility and residential structures, raised the percentage for
industrial structures, and 'maintained straight—line for commercial real estate
(straight—line is preferred over accelerated methods due to more onerous
recapture provisions upon sale).9 The 1981 Actpromised more accelerated
methods in 1985, but the 1982 Tax Act reneged on the promise and reduced the
depreciable base for equipment by one—half the investment tax credit. The 1984
Act raised the tax life for structures, other than public utilities, back to 18
years and this was raised further to 19 years in late 1985.—9—
The Administration plan retreated from theseprinciples in significant
respects: all interest would continue to be deductible; investors in
nondepreciable assets would have the option of paying taxeson- nominal capital
gains at one—half of th regular income tax rate; taxdepreciation would
exceed economic depreciation; only one—tenth of dividendswould be deductible;
and, in order to make the plan revenue neutral, the indexatjonof inventory
gains is dropped. Tax depreciation would beespecially generous for equipment
that continues to be classified as 3 or 5years and for public utility
structures; allowable depreciation would exceed that undercurrent law even at
zero inflation. However, most 5—year equipment would bereclassified as 6,7
and even 10—year equipment. For industrialstructures, tax depreciation would
be more favorable only at inflation rates ofroughly 5 percent or greater. The
House bill has double declining balance depreciationfor equipment and public
utility structures, but longer depreciation tax lives than theAdministration
p'an and Only partial indexation of thedepreciable base (half of the inflation
above 5 percent) results in significantly lessfavorable overall depreciation.
The partial dividend exclusion is of littleimport in our model because
Only 10 percent of equity financing is assumed to be fromnew share issues on
which dividends are paid. (Dividendsare saved initially by the retention of
earnings, offsetting the future payment of dividends.) Thusy in the model is
only 0.05 under the Treasury plan and 0.01 under the Administrationplan, 10
percent of the 50 and 10 percent exclusions,
respectively.
In our analysis of owner—occupied housing,we consider households at five
different income levels in order to deduce the taxrates that are
representative of households in five incomeranges. The ranges for 1980 are
listed in the top panel of Table 4; the 1985ranges, which exceed those from
1980 by a third to two—fifths to reflect thegrowth in nominal incomes per
household, are listed in the lower panel.(The exact income levels for which
the tax rate calculations were performed are listed inparentheses.) The—10—
state—and—local and federal tax rates relevant to the quantity—demanded
decision in 1980 are listed in the next two columns in the top panel, and the
total tax rate ——thefederal plus the state times one minus the federal ——is
shown in the fourth column. For the highest income class, x. =x .Forthe
j e
other classes, the x. equal 8 (equals 1 except in the Treasury plan) times the
t. shown in the table. The interest indexation feature of the Treasury plan (8<
]
1) has a major impact on the opportunity cost of own equity financing of
owner—occupied housing (as well as on tax—exempt yields ——seenote a to Table
3)11 The last column is the tax rate relevant to tenure choice (a weighted
average of the average tax rates applied to debt and equity) l2 The lower
panel lists similar calculations for 1985 incomes under current law and the tax
reforms, the Treasury and Administration proposals reflecting the
nondeductibility of state and local taxes.
II. The Capital Allocation Model'3
An Overview
The basic model allocates a fixed private capital stock among various
classes of nonresidential and residential capital. The allocation depends on
the rental or user costs for the capital components, the price elasticities of
demand with respect to the rental costs, and the elasticities of homeownership
with respect to the cost of owning versus renting. The interest rate adjusts
in response to tax changes so as to maintain the aggregate demand for capital
at its initial level. The fixed capital stock assumption implies zero interest
elasticity of saving.
Table 5 lists the distribution of the U.S. capital stock at the end of
1984 by type. A number of simplifying assumptions are made in the construction
of the model. Because well over 90 percent of inventories are held by
corporations and nearly 90 percent of rental housing is held by noncorporate
business, we assume that each of these assets is held totally by corporate and—11—
noncorporate business, respectively. While equipment isdepreciable over 3 or
5 years, about 95 percent of it is classifiedas S—year. We treat all
equipment as 5—year. Because public utility structures(which are virtually
all corporate) are depreciated over a shorterlife that other Structures and
are eligible for the investment tax credit,they are treated separately. With
these assumptions and distinctions, thecapital shares in 1980 and 1984 are
those listed in the percent share columns.The last column indicates that a
reallocation of capital toward equipment andcommercial real estate occurred
between 1980 and 1984.
Current law treats owner—occupied housing
differently depending upon the
tax position of the owner, with higher incomehouseholds paying a lower rental
cost owing to their lower after—taxfinancing rate. Thus it is necessary to
distribute the housing stock across householdsat different income levels. The
distribution depends upon the number ofowners within each income range as well
a the income range and the rental costs foreach of the ranges.
For all assets except rental housing, the demandfor the asset is
determined by the investor in the asset, be ita corporation, unincorporated
business or a household. For rentalhousing, demand is determined by renters,
based upon their incomes and the marketrent level. Thus, the total quantity
of rental housing, like the totalquantity of owner housing, is built up as the
sumofthe demands by households in different incomebrackets.
Table 6 indicates divisions of the demand forhousing across the same
five income classes listed,.jn Table 4, witha lower income class of all renters
added. The first three columns contain theincome classes selected, the
division of 80 million households across theseclasses, and the assumed
ownership rates for these classes. Columns 4 and 5give the distribution of
the income of owners and rentersacross these classes. Column 4 is the product
of the first three columns dividedby the sum of the products. In the column 5
calculation, the fraction of households owning isreplaced by the fraction—12—
renting. Columns 6 and 7givethe distribution of the owned and rented stocks.
These distributions and the ownership rates were calculated from model
equations described below. Based upon 1980 data, the equations imply an
aggregate Ownership rate of 0.59, slightly below that existing then.
Model Equations
The model explains 13 rental costs: seven for the different types of
nonresidential capital, five for owner—occupied housing of households in our
five income ranges, and one for rental housing. As discussed in theprevious
section, these costs depend on numerous provisions of the tax law, the
depreciation rate of the asset, the expected inflation rate and the level of
interest rates in the economy. Moreover, rental costs for household tenure
choice decisions (s.)differfrom those for quantity demanded decisions (p.)
because the tax rates relevant to the after—tax financing rates differ (see
Table 4) .Wesummarize the rental cost equations as
=
pk(taxk,d.,7T,i)
p.= p.(tax.,d.rr,i) (8)—(12) J JJ 3
p= p(tax,d,TT,i) (13)
=.(ta,,d,Tr,j). (14)—(18) J 333
There are seven demand equations for nonresidential capital (NK)
corporate inventories, corporate and noncorporate 5—year equipment, 10— and
15—year public utility structures, and other corporate(industrial) and
noncorporate (commercial) structures. Assuming that production functions are
Cobb—Douglass fBerndt(1976)], these demand equations can bewritten as—13—
=
Zk/pk, (19)—(25)
where the Zk are Constants (depending on given outputs) and thek are the
rental costs.
The housing demand and tenure choice equations come from the
specification of a translog indirect utility function for households(King,
1980) and the empirical application of it to the ownership decision
(Hendershott and Shilling, 1982). The estimated odds of owningequation was
log =—3.846log[./(p/.9)]—.383[(1ogj2—(logp1.9)2).
The division by 0.9 reflects the fact that those renting have topay more than
the user cost to offset the revenues lost from vacancies.Taking antilogs and
solving, the Ownership rates for the five highest income classes are
L. L. 0. =ej/(l—e j), (26)—(30)
where the L. equal the right—hand side of the log [o./(l—o.)]expression. The
ownership rate for the lowest income class is assumed to be zero.
There are also five demand equations for owner housing and six forrental
housing based on our six income classes, the lowest of which consistssolely of
renters. These demands ar the products of the demandsper owning/renting
household and the number of owning/renting households. Thespecific form of
the equations comes from application of Roys identity to the indirectutility
function and substitution from the estimated odds of owningequation. For
owner housing (OH), the demand equations are—14—
OHj =oHHZ(3.846
+.766log p.)/p., (31)—(35)
where o. is the ownership rate for the jth class, l-IH. is the number of
households in the jth class, and the Z. are constants which are proportional to
the incomes of representative households in the classes. For rental households
(RH), the equations are
RH. =(l—o.)HH.Z.(3.846+.766log p/.9)/(p/.9). (36)—(41)
3 JJJ
where p/.9 is the rental price facing all renting households.
Lastly, equality between the sum of the demands and the existing capital
stock determines the level 0interestrates in the economy:
NK +ZOH.+RB. K. (42) k j j
Given a specific tax regime and assumed levels of the interest and
expected inflation rates, the k' ,andp can be computed. The NKk were
listed in Table 5, and the OH. and RH. are products of the total residential
3 J
structures share reported in Table 5 and the fractions of those shares listed
in Table 6. The o. and iiH. were also listed in Table 6. The Z can be
j j k
calculated from equations (l9)—(25); the Z. are proportional to the incomes of
the representative households in the classes and are scaled such that the sum
of the demands for owner and rental housing (as proportions of the total
capital stock) equals the existing housing stock (as a proportion of total
capital)
A number of simplifying assumptions of the model should be noted. These
include, but are not limited to,, constant risk premia and infinite real supply
price elasticities (zero transactions costs) and thus constant real asset
prices. Simulated changes in the allocation of capital are thus meant to—15—
indicate how the composition of net investment would be altered by tax (and
inflation) changes, not precisely what the new capital allocation will be five
or ten years following a change in tax regime or inflation rate.
III. The Changing Tax and Inflation Environment, 1980—85
In this section we deduce the impact of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 on interest rates, the homeownership rate, and the allocation of real
capital. Because over four years have now passed since the passage of ERTA, we
can also "test" the underlying simulation model by comparing the simulated
impact of the Act with observed events. This requires analyzing all major
disturbances that have occurred since early 1981, not just the passage of ERTA.
The first part of this section simulates the impacts of ERTA alone and of ERTA
combined with a decline in the inflation rate. The second part compares the
simulated impacts with observed changes in recent years.
E1TA and Disinflation
The disturbance of major interest to us is the passage of the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. As documented in Section I, this Act substantially
enhanced tax depreciation allowances and lowered personal tax rates. A second
major phenomenon in the early 1980s was a reduction in the inflation rate. In
1980, inflation was proceeding at a 10 percent rate; by 1984 and 1985, the
rate was slightly below 4 percent. We presume that the decline in the long—run
expected inflation rate was a smaller drop from 8 to 5 percent, the 10 percent
reflecting temporarily surging energy prices and declining value of the dollar
and the 4 percent rate reflecting the reverse.
The first column of Table 7 lists the assumed 1980 interest and inflation
rates, the model simulated homeownership rate, and the 1980 distribution of the
capital stock listed in Table 5. The second column contains the model
simulation results for these variables (except for the assumed constant
inflation rate) based upon enactment of ERTA. The third column reflects ERTA—16—
(and the 1982 reduction in the depreciation base by half of the investment tax
credit) plus a decline in the inflation rate to 5 percent. These simulations
are discussed in turn.
Comparing the second and first columns, the more favorable tax treatment
of depreciable property provided by ERTA raises the demand for such capital at
Pre—ERTA interest rates. While the cut in personal tax rates lowers the demand
for owner—occupied housing ——theafter—tax financing rate and opportunity cost
of owner equity rise ——thedecline is not nearly sufficient to offset the
increased demand for other capital, so interest rates rise.'4 Thecomputed
increase is just over a percentage point.
In spite of this increase, the hurdle rates for equipment, industrial
structures and public utilities decline by 2½, 1½ and 1 percentage points,
respectively. Those for depreciable real estate are roughly unchanged (the
interest rate increase and more generous depreciation roughlyoffsetting),
wciiie those for inventories andowner—occupied housing increase by just over a
percentage point. The homeownership rate declines by 4½ percentage points. On
net, the capital stock is shifted sharply from residential to nonresidential
uses, with the aggregate housing stock declining by 9½ percent. Of the
nonresidential components, the increases are roughly 10 percent forequipment
and industrial structures and about 5 percent for public utilities and
commercial real estate. Inventories decline by one percent.
Incorporating a 3 percentage point decline in the inflation rate sharply
alters the results. Becau the interest rate declines byroughly a point and
a half for each point decline in inflation, disinflation is good forowner—
occupied housing; the real after—tax financing rate will decline for
households in tax brackets below 33 percent. Thus we seea 4 percentage point
increase in the homeownership rate relative to the case ofno decline in
inflation. The total housing stock is roughly unchanged, however;the
increase in owner—occupied housing is about offset by the decline inrental—17—
housing. The disinflation also induces a shift in the composition of
structures, with corporate structures rising and highly—levered noncorporate
structures declining (the advantages of debt are reduced at lower interest
rates)
A Comparison with Observed Chan9es
Model simulations should not be expected to track observed economic
changes closely. Simulations provide an estimate of where an economy in full
equilibrium at the initial parameter values will eventually move in response to
a specified disturbance (change in model parameters, Structure or state of
world) .However,even if the model accurately characterizes the economy, the
observed economic changes may differ from those implied by the model for two
reasons. First, the economy may have been a significant distance from full
equilibrium when the disturbance occurred. If the tendency toward this
equilibrium differs significantly from the tendency created by the specified
disturbance, the observed changes in the economy may not resemble the simulated
changes. Second, disturbances other than those specified may have occurred.
If these have impacts that correlate negatively in some respects from the
specified disturbances, again the simulated changes may differ significantly
from the actual changes. Nonetheless, simulations of the major disturbances to
an economy should trace out the broad contours of subsequent economic events.
The principal phenomena that the model simulations would lead us to
expect are:
(1) an increase in long—term interest rates until the decline in long—run
expected inflation sets in,
(2) a shift from owning to renting, until the impact of the decline in long—
run expected inflation is felt, and
(3) a shift from residential (and inventory) to nonresidential uses,
especially equipment investment early on.
The correspondence of observed events with each of these expectations is
discussed in turn.—18—
Table 8 contains data on the corporate bond rate and two measures of the
December—to—December changes in the CPI: all items less food, energy and home
purchase and finance and the new CPI X—I, which became the official CPI after
1982. The major difference between the inflation series is the exclusion of
food and energy from the former; these components rose particularly rapidly in
the late 1970s and 1980 and slowly in the 1982—84 period. The bond rate
certainly jumped in 1981 and 1982. The rate exceeded 14 percent for the entire
July 1981—July 1982 period (was over 15 percent in September—October 1981 and
January—February 1982) before plummeting by year end 1982. The one—year
inflation rate also plummeted in 1982 and has continued to drift downward since
then.A lagged response of long—run expected inflation to short—run observed
inflation would suggest a gradual decline in theformer throughout the 1983—85
period. Ingeneral, we would anticipate that the1981—84 data changes would
largely reflect the ERTA simulation, with post—1984 data gradually reflecting
the ERTA plus disinflation simulation.
The correspondence between simulations of the homeownership rate and
observed changes is especially tenuous because the changes are quite Sensitive
to shifts in the age composition of the population. To illustrate, the
aggregate rate rose by only 3½ percentage points between 1960 and 1979, even
though ownership rates of every age cohort rose by close to 10 percentage
points. The reason for this discrepancy was a surge in young households (under
25)who tend to rent and a relative decline in older households (over 34) who
predominantlyown. The dat,ain Table 8illustrate the dependency of ownership
on age. Old households tend to be less mobile, have higher incomes, and be
wealthier, characteristics that lower the effective cost of owning.
The data in Table 9 refer to married couples only in order to abstract
from other demographic effects, but the results would be roughly comparable for
all households. As can be seen, a shift to homeownership occurred for all age
groups between 1974 and 1980 and even continued after 1980 for households over—19—
age 54. For younger more mobile households who are more likely to be making
tenure decisions based upon current economic conditions, 1980 was a watershed
for ownership. In just three years, the ownership rate for those under 40
declined by 4 to 6½ percentage points, just as would be anticipated under the
ERTA scenario. Whether the offsetting disinflation impact will be observed in
later data is uncertain.
The ERTA simulation suggests a large decline in residential structures
and an increase in equipment. These shifts are reflected in the 1984 data (see
Table 4) with the equipment share already up by half the predicted 11 percent
increase and residential structures down by one—quarter of the estimated 9½
percent decline. Much of the observed decline is certainly due to the changed
behavior of younger households. If this change were allowed to work its way
through to older households in a long—run adjustment, the decline in
residential structures would approach the large simulated decline.
The observed reallocation of nonresidential structures does not
correspond nearly as well with the hypothesized partial movement to the
simulated new equilibrium. Commercial structures have already increased in
share by more than the simulated amount, while public utility structures have
declined significantly as a share of the total capital stock (not increased as
the simulation predicts) and industrial Structures have risen little. Even
here, plausible explanations are available. The expansion of the
rehabilitation tax credit in ERTA, which is not reflected in the simulations,
must have significantly inoreased the value of commercial structures;
moreover, high vacancy rates suggest that commercial structures have been over
built ——thenew equilibrium could entail a less than four percent increase in
this share. As for the relative decline in public utility structures, energy
conservation in response to the sharp run up in real energy prices in the
1979—81 period and the well—publicized problems of the nuclear power industry
are likely causes. Dwelling on such explanations is probably not worthwhile;—20—
the important fact is that observed data, on the whole, are not inconsistent
with the ERTA model simulationJ5 Thus, the simulation model appears to be a
reasonable vehicle for analyzing the impact of proposed tax reforms.
IV. Capital Allocation Under Current Law and Proposed Tax Reforms
The likely impacts of the Treasury and Administration tax reform proposals
and the House bill on the level of interest rates, rental user costs, capital
shares, and the homeownership rate are calculated in this section. We begin
with a comparison of the risk—adjusted net user costs and interest rates under
current law and the reforms and then turn to the capital stock effects. The
analysis presumes 5 percent inflation. The sensitivity to inflation of various
tax regimes is then examined, and efficiency losses from the misallocation of
capital under the regimes are calculated.
Five Percent Inflation: Net Rental Costs
The risk—adjusted net (of depreciation) rental costs for alternative
investments are reported in Table 10 for current law and three reforms.(The
risk adjustment is 0.04 for nonreal estate assets and 0.015 for depreciable real
estate.) The interest rate (risk—free) under current law is presumed to be 10
percent (slightly above the 9½ percent model simulation of a 5 percent inflation
world with ERTA tax law). The first numbers (those not in parentheses) given
for the reforms are based upon the listed model—computed interest rates; the
numbers in parentheses presume an unchanged 10 percent interest rate.
Under a neutral tax system, the risk—adjusted net hurdle rates would be
the same for all assets. As can be seen, this is far from true under current
law. The tax—favored assets are housing of high—income owners and noncorporate
equipment. The tax—penalized assets are corporate structures, especially
industrial structures that receive no tax credit, and inventories, whose
inflationary gains are not indexed (with r=O.7t,t= 0.5and 11= 0.05,the
inflation tax raises the user cost by 0.035) .Moregenerally, corporate—21—
investments are penalized relative to noncorporate; less—leveraged investments
are penalized relative to more—leveraged investments; and risky assets are
penalized relative to less risky assets (Bulow and Summers, 1984) .Theover
three and a half percentage point difference in net hurdle rates for industrial
and rental structures reflects all three penalties. The largest penalty is the
difference in asset risk, 0.05 for nonreal estate versus 0.025 for real estate,
which accounts for 2 of the 3½ points. The corporate (double taxation) penalty
is the smallest, accounting for onlyof the 3½ points because the taxation of
corporate equity at the personal level is relatively light under the new view of
corporate financing.
The Treasury plan greatly reduces the difference in risk—adjusted net
hurdle rates among corporate assets by eliminating the inventory tax and the
investment tax credit. All hurdle rates move toward that for industrial
structures. The gross hurdle rate (net plus depreciation rate plus 0.04) for
equipment rises by 14 percent and that for public utility structures rises by 8
percent, while that for inventories (with their 100 percent depreciation) falls
by 3 percent. However, the plan increases the advantages of real estate. While
the hurdle rates for depreciable properties are roughly unchanged (at 3 points
below those for corporate assets), those for owner—occupied housing decline
significantly; the 2.6 percentage point fall in the level of interest rates
swamps the loss of the property tax deduction and the reduction in rates at
which interest is deductible.
The increased advantage of owner—occupied housing stems from two factors:
removal of tax advantages for business capital (especially the investment tax
credit) and the introduction of an additional advantage for owner—occupied
housing (the nonindexation of mortgage interest expense) .Thedata in the third
column of Table 10 are calculations assuming the Treasury plan were amended to
include indexation of home mortgage interest expense. As can be seen, full
indexation lowers the interest rate by another 30 basis points and the hurdle—22—
rates for business investments by 40 basis points. In contrast, the declines in
the hurdle rates for middle—income owner—occupied housing are reduced by 25
basis points, and high—income owner—occupied housing faces a 50 basis point rise
in hurdle rate.
The Administration plan drops interest indexation (and thus the new
advantage for owner—occupied housing) ,deletesinventory indexation (in the
revisions needed to achieve revenue neutrality) ,and"gives back" part of the
investment tax credit by accelerating depreciation deductions for equipment and
public utilities relative to economic depreciation; the present value of a
dollar of depreciation on 5—year equipment increases from 76 to 85 cents, while
that for 15—year public utilities rises from 50 to 76 cents or by over 50
percent. The latter change is so generous that the investment hurdle rate
actually declines in spite of the loss of the ITC. With these changes, the
level of interest rates falls by only 60 basis points, and the net result is a
tax system that is less tilted toward high—income owner—occupied housing than
current law.
The House bill postpones depreciation deductions, except on equipment,
even more than the Treasury plan and does not index depreciation deductions
unless inflation exceeds 5 percent. As a result of these changes and the
removal of the investment tax credit, the aggregate demand for capital falls
sharply and a 125 basis point decline in the level of interest rates occurs, a
decline which significantly lowers the cost of owner—occupied housing at all
except the very highest income levels. Like the Treasury plan, the House bill
would tend to equalize net user costs across corporate investments.
As discussed, the model computes the level of interest rates that would
maintain the aggregate demand for capital (net investment in a growth context)
at its prereform level. However, a decline in U.S. interest rates would
represent a decline in after—tax returns to foreigners unless foreign countries
cut their marginal tax rates on interest income or move their interest rates—23—
pan pu with those in the U.S. As a result capital would flow out of the
U.S. and domestic interest rates would not need to fall as much to bring the
demand and supply of capital in the U.S. into balance. In the extreme case of
no adjustment in foreign taxes or interest rates and prefectly elastic
international capital flows, U.S. interest rates would not fall at all but the
U.S. capital stock would, the fall being greater the larger is the decline in
interest rates computed from the fixed—capital stock model.'6 A more balanced
view would incorporate less than perfectly elastic capital flows and significant
changes in foreign interest rates in response to movements in U.S. rates. Thus
a fall in foreign demand for U.S. capital would tend to dampen the decline in
U.S. rates, but not eliminate it.
To indicate the sensitivity of the relationships among the adjusted net
rental costs to the Computed interest rate declines, rental costs based upon no
rate decline have been computed and are listed in parentheses in Table 10. With
higher (than the model—computed) interest rates, the rental costs are higher.
For the Administration and House reforms, the relationships among the costs are
little affected. For the Treasury plan, the already strong bias toward owner—
occupied housing is magnified because all home mortgage interest is deductible
whereas only the real component of interest financing other investments is.
Five Percent Inflation: Capital Stock Impacts
The data in Table 11 suggest how the capital stock would be reallocated
under the various reforms. These reallocations follow fairly directly from the
realignment of investment hurdle rates just discussed. Removal of the inflation
tax raises inventories, while the loss of the investment tax credit tends to
shrink equipment and utilities, although utilities would actually rise in
response to the far more generous depreciation allowances of the Administration
plan. The Treasury and Administration reforms have sharply different impacts on
the three types of structures. Under the Treasury plan, residential structures
rise by 8 percent, while industrial and commercial structures are unaffected.—24—
Under the Administration plan, the reverse is true; residential structures are
roughly unchanged while industrial and commercial structures rise by 8 percent.
Moreover, the homeownership rate rises by 6 percentage points under the Treasury
plan, but falls by 4 points under the Administration plan. The reallocations
under the House bill are close to those of the Treasury plan, although the
increase in the homeownership rate is only 2½ percentage points.
In general, an across the board cut in tax rates would be expected to have
a negative impact on owner—occupied housing, the income from which is not taxed.
This impact would be reinforced by a loss of the deductibility of property taxes
on primary residences. Thus, the homeownership rate would decline, as would the
share of structures in residential use. The simulated effect of the
Administration plan corresponds to these expectations. The inverted effect of
the Treasury plan follows from its interest indexation provision and the sharp
decline in interest rates (largely in response to the indexation). A decline in
interest rates is more beneficial to investors in low tax brackets than to those
in high brackets because the investor receives more of the rate decline (and the
Treasury receives less) .Thusa sharp decline in interest rates is particularly
beneficial to housing demanded by low and middle income owners. This factor is
exaggerated in the Treasury plan by the exemption of home mortgage interest
expense from the interest indexation feature. Thus housing of owners at all
income levels (but especially at lower incomes) increases, and the homeownership
rate jumps. The demand for owner—occupied housing would also rise under the
House bill. This reflects the absence of a cut in the tax rates relevant to the
quantity—demanded decision of owners with incomes under $100,000 (see Table 4),
the continued deductibility of property taxes, and the sharp 125 basis point
decline in interest rates.—25—
Inflation Neutrality
Next we consider the impact of inflation under the various tax regimes by
simulating an increase in inflation from zero to 10 percent. Inflation is quite
negative for owner—occupied housing under current law because the average tax
rate at which expenses are deductible is significantly less for owner housing
(except for owners with very high incomes) than for other capital. Thus, the
real after—tax interest rate paid by owners tends to rise, while that for other
capital falls (see Titman, 1982 and Follain, l986).17 On the other hand,
inflation is very positive for depreciable real estate because the advantages of
debt are magnified at higher interest rate levels. Thus the increase in
inflation lowers the homeownership rate by 11 percentage points (the first
column of Table 12), and raises the demand for both rental and commercial
structures, the latter by 19 percent. The total housing stock increases because
the stimulus to renter housing outweighs the negative impact on owner housing.
With real estate expanding, the other capital components must decline. As can
be seen, di/dir =1.46,midway between the nontax (unity) and tax [di/dil =1/(l—
T)"-21 Fisherian values.
The Treasury plan makes a serious attempt at achieving inflation
neutrality by setting tax depreciation equal to economic depreciation and
indexing capital gains, depreciation allowances and interest. Unfortunately,
the plan fails badly. To understand the failure, it is best to consider first
the impact of an increase in inflation in a fully—indexed variant of the
Treasury plan, i.e., one in-which home mortgage interest expense is also
indexed. The data in the second column of Table 12 show this impact. Increases
in inflation are generally favorable for the sector with the highest tax rate
(noncorporate business has a tax rate of 0.41 versus 0.37 for the corporate
sector) because the after—tax interest rate rises least. The aggregate
homeownership rate declines because the negative impact on lower income (tax)
households outweighs the positive impact on high income households. The—26—
interest rate rises by more than the increase in inflation because of imperfect
indexation; under our assumptions, only a third of interest is real at 5
percent inflation [(7.42—5)/7.421,but the Treasury indexation formula would
treat six—elevenths as real (see note 10) .Withsome inflationary interest
being taxed, the interest rate responds more than one—for—one to inflation.
Nonetheless, the fully—indexed variant of the Treasury plan is significantly
less sensitive to inflation than current law; more specifically the sharp tilt
toward depreciable real estate is greatly dampened.
Exclusion of home mortgage interest from the indexation provision changes
the impact of inflation enormously. Homeownership and the demand for owner—
occupied housing are greatly stimulated by inflation because the real—after tax
financing rate for even our lowest income owning households declines. The surge
in housing is matched by declines in all other capital types. The actual
Treasury plan proposed is even less inflation neutral than current law.
The next to the last column in Table 12 shows the impact of inflation on
capital allocation under the Administration tax plan. Just as under current
law, the homeownership rate would be significantly lowered by inflation.
However, the stimulation for depreciable real estate and constriction of
nonresidential capital would be far less. The Administration plan is thus
significantly more inflation neutral than current law. The last column suggests
that the House bill would be marginally more neutral than current law.
Efficiency Losses
The differences in the risk—adjusted net rental costs in Table 10 provide
a general indication of the misallocation of capital under the various tax laws.
A single efficiency loss number for each tax regime is computed from the
Harberger equation:—27—
LOSS= —ADJp.)(CAP. —EFFCAP.),
J J J J
where the ADJ0.'sarethe risk—adjusted net user costs listed in Table 10,
EFFADJp is the single risk—adjusted net user cost (0.0406) that when used to
obtain gross user costs equates the sum of the demands for capital to the
aggregate stock, the CAPj are the likely percentage capital stocks under a given
tax law (listed in Table 13), and the EFFCAP. are the percentage allocations
when the gross user costs are based on EFFADJp. The efficient allocation of
capital is listed in the first column of Table 13.
The efficiency loss under current law, listed at the bottom of Table 13,
is roughly 0.12 percent of the capital stock or about 0.25 percent ofGNP.18
The major source of the loss is 10 percent too much residential capital (largely
offset by 24 percent too few industrial structures and 12 percent too few
utility structures).19 The widely—cited overinvestment is equipment is only 3
percent; while substantial overinvestment in equipment exists relative to
corporate structures, overinvestment relative to capital generally is minor. Of
the three reforms, only the Administration plan reduces the efficiency loss, and
the reduction is a sharp 50 percent. This is achieved by both a better
allocation between residential and nonresidential capital (the overinvestment in
residential capital is reduced from 10 to 8 percent) and better allocations
within the residential and nonresidential sectors. The difference between the
net user costs for the highest and lowest income owning households is reduced
from 0.029 to 0.018, and the large underinvestment in corporate structures is
reduced significantly.
The Treasury plan and the House bill would increase the efficiency loss by
53 and 36 percent, respectively, the principal reason being the further
overinvestment in residential capital (18 and 17 percent versus the current 10
percent) .Notonly do these bills remove the investment tax credit for
equipment and utilities, but they reduce the value of depreciation deductions.—28—
The greater efficienty loss under the Treasury plan relative to the House bill
is attributable to a substantial increase in the existing bias in favor of
owning over renting. This, in turn, is due to the great advantage of debt
financing of owner—occupied housing given by the partial taxation of interest
income but full deduction of home mortgage interest expense. The fully—indexed
Treasury variant (only real mortgage interest expense is deductible) leads to a
smaller increase in residential capital, a better allocation within residential,
and thus a negligible 6 percent increase in the efficiency loss.
Efficiency losses have also been calculated at different inflation rates.
The losses under all tax regimes are lower at a zero inflation rate and greater
at 10 percent inflation. For current law, the loss is 12 percent less at zero
inflation and 37 percent greater at 10 percent inflation. The efficiency loss
under the Administration plan is roughly half that of current law over the
entire inflation range examined. At zero inflation, the losses under the
Tteasury plan and House bill are virtually identical to those under current law.
At higher inflation rates the losses, especially under the Treasury plan,
increase relative to current law; at 10 percent inflation the loss under the
Treasury plan is nearly double that under current law. Such is not the case
with the fully—indexed Treasury variant; its loss at 10 percent inflation is
slightly less than that of current law.
V. Summary
The paper begins with- presentation of a methodology for computing annual
rental costs of capital or investment hurdle rates under any tax regime. Tax
law over the 1980—84 period is specified and the provisions of the Treasury and
Administration tax reform proposals and HR 3838 are described. A model is then
constructed to allow calculation of the impact of changes in tax regimes and/or
expected inflation on interest rates and the allocation of real capital. The
model allocates a fixed private capital stock among various classes of—29—
nonresidential and residential capital, depending upon the rental costs for the
capital components, the price elasticities of demand with respect to the rental
costs, and the elasticities of homeownership with respect to the cost of owning
versus renting. The interest rate adjusts in response to tax/inflation changes
so as to maintain the aggregate demand for capital at this initial level.
Simulation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 suggests an increase
in interest rates, a decrease in homeownership, and a shift in capital from
residential to nonresidential uses, especially equipment. Data since 1980 are
consistent with these "forecasts" when one abstracts from the impact of the
decline in inflation on interest rates after the middle of 1982. The decline in
ownership is restricted to younger (under 40) households who are likely to be
making tenure decisions based upon current economic conditions. The general
correspondence between these simulations and recent economic events suggests
that the simulation model is appropriate for analyzing the impact of proposed
tax reforms.
Under a neutral tax system, the risk—adjusted net (of depreciation)
investment hurdle rates would be the same for all assets. This is far from true
under current law. The tax—favored assets are housing of high—income owners and
noncorporate equipment. The most tax—penalized asset is inventories, whose
inflationary gains are not indexed. Corporate structures are also penalized,
especially industrial structures that receive no tax credit. More generally,
corporate investments are penalized relative to noncorporate; less—leveraged
investments are penalized relative to more—leveraged investments; and risky
assets are penalized relative to less risky assets.
The Treasury plan greatly reduces the difference in risk—adjusted net
hurdle rates among corporate assets by eliminating the inventory tax and the
investment tax credit. However, the plan increases the advantages of real
estate. While the hurdle rates for equipment and uti1ities rise to that for
industrial structures, those for owner—occupied housing decline significantly in—30—
response to a 2.6 percentage point decline in interest rates (and the
nonindexation of home mortgage interest expense) .TheAdministration plan drops
interest indexation and accelerates depreciation deductions for equipment and,
especially, public utilities relative to economic depreciation. With these
changes, the level of interest rates falls by only 0.6 percentage points, and
the demand for owner—occupied housing by middle and high income households
declines. In contrast, the House bill has even less general depreciation
allowances than current law, Consequently, hurdle rates for equipment and
utilities rise sharply, while the 125 basis point decline in interest rates
lowers hurdle rates for owner—Occupied housing. The basic results are the same
in the absence of interest—rate declines; hurdle rates decline relatively for
owner—occupied housing under the Treasury plan and House bill, but not under the
Administration plan. That is, whether rates decline or not the former two
roposals would tilt the playing field toward owner—occupied housing, the most
tx formed asset under current law.
Reallocation of the capital stock follows fairly directly from the
realignment of investment hurdle rates. Removal of the inflation tax raises
inventories, while the loss of the investment tax credit tends to shrink
equipment and utilities, although utilities would actually rise in response to
the far more generous depreciation allowances of the Administration plan. While
the specific provisions of the Treasury plan and the House bill differ widely,
these two reforms should be expected to have remarkably similar impacts on
capital allocation. In contrast, the Administration plan would have a sharply
different impact on the three types of structures. Under the Treasury and House
plans, residential structures rise by 8 percent, while industrial and commercial
structures are largely unaffected. Under the Administration plan, the reverse
is true. Moreover, the homeownership rate rises significantly under the
Treasury and House plans, but falls by 4 points under the Administration plan.—31—
Inflation is quite negative for
owner—occupied housing under current law
because the average tax rateat which expenses are deductibleis significantly
less for owner housing than for
other capital. Thus, the realafter—tax
interest rate paid by ownerstends to rise with an increasein inflation, while
that for other capital falls.
On the other hand, inflation isvery positive for
depreciable real estate because theadvantages of debt are magnified athigher
interest rate levels. Whilean increase in inflation lowers the
homeownership
rate, commercial structures increase
sharply. Moreover, total housing increases
because the stimulus to
renter housing outweighs thenegative impact on owner
housing. With real estateexpanding, the other capitalcomponents decline.
The Treasury plan makesa Serious attempt at achievinginflation
neutrality by setting tax depreciationequal to economic depreciation and
indexing capital gains, depreciationallowances and interest.
Unfortunately,
the plan fails badly. While
a fully—indexed variant of theTreasury plan would
b less Sensitive toinflation than current law,exclusion of home mortgage
interest expense from the indexationprovision of the Treasury planreverses
this result. Honleownershipand the demand forowner_occupied housing are
strongly stimulated because the
real—aftet tax financing rate foreven low
income owning households declines.The surge in housing is matchedby declines
in all Other capitaltypes.
Just as under current law, the
homeownership rate would besignificantly
lowered by inflation if theAdministration plan or House billwere in place.
However, the Stimulation of—depreciable
real estate and the constrictionof
nonresidential capital would be farless under the Admini5trationplan. The
Administration plan is thussignificantly more inflation neutral thancurrent
law; the House bill would bemildly more neutral.
Of the three plans,
only that proposed by the Administrationwould lead to
a more efficient allocation of
capital, i.e., one that is less biasedtoward
high—income housing andaway from corporate structures. Thecurrent efficiency—32—
loss would be roughly halved. The Treasury plan, while equating hurdle rates
across corporate assets, would greatly increase the current efficiency loss at
positive inflation rates by stimulating additional overinvestment in housing.
The increases in the loss would be roughly 50 percent at 5 percent inflation and
nearly 100 percent at 10 percent inflation. The House bill, too, would increase
the efficiency loss, and for the same reason, but the increase would be a
smaller 25 to 40 percent at inflation rates between 3 and 10 percent.—33-
FOOTNOTES
1.Earlier simulation analyses of ERTA includeGravelle (1982) and Hendershott
and Shilling (1982)
2. We do not consider the impact ofimperfect loss offsets. For an analysis of
these and other details of corporatetaxation, see Auerbach (1983)
3. Because property taxes onowner—occupied housing are deductible, the tax
saving from these taxes on a dollar of housing
(assuming a property tax rate of
0.012) is subtracted from the right side of(1)
4. Optimal bond trading is discussed inConstantjnjdes and Ingersoll (1984).
Other sources of the low implicityield in longer—term tax exempts are the
greater risk of losses due to default and callon municipals relative to
Treasuries and the 80 percent limitation ofthe portion of interest on
indebtedness used to carry taxexempts that commercial banks can deduct.
5. While the explicit and implicit taxrates relevant to the quantity_demanded
decision are marginal rates, those relevantto the decision of whether to own
or rent depend on the average rates at whichinterest for the entire house
purchase is deducted and on which the entireowner—equity investment would have
been taxed (Hendershott and Slemrod,1983).
6. One million of the 1—4 unitproperties in 1980 were no more than a decade
old, as were 77,500 of the 5—49 unitproperties and 22,700 of the over—50 unit
properties. With 1.3, 11 and 160,respectively, as the average nunther of units
in each of these three classes of
properties, 63 percent of the total units no
more than a decade old were in properties with 50or more units. Because a-*
significantnumber of the 1—4 unit properties were originally built for
ownership, two—thirds to three—quarters of the newly—constructed rental units
were probably in properties with 50 or more units.
7. Sixty percent of owning households with incomes under $15,000 in 1983 had
house—to—income ratios exceeding 4, suggesting that the households were retired
and did not have a mortgage. In contrast, eighty percent of owning households
with incomes over $25,000 had mortgages and only five percent with incomes
above $25,000 had house—to—income ratios above 4.
8. The National Association of Homebuilders (1985, p.51) assumes a 14 percent
value for e when tissix percent. This inflation rate translates into a tax—
exempt rate just above 8 percent in our model and thus a risk premium of about
6 percent. Price—Waterhouse has used an e of 16 percent in their calculations.
9. The 1981 act also expanded the investment tax credit slightly. Both this
expansion and the more generous depreciation deductions were effective January
1, 1981.
10. The Treasury would assume a real interest rate of 6 percent and allow the
deduction of (or would tax) Only 6/(6+n) of interest paid (or earned), where it
isthe actual inflation rate in a tax year. Thus if inflation were 5 percent,
only 55 percent of interest would be taxed and deducted. With zero inflation,
all interest would be taxed and deducted; with 10% inflation only 38 percent
would.(However, mortgage interest outlays on one's principal residence would
be fully deductible.)-.35—
11. Because only 55%/38% of nominalinterest income would be taxed ina
five/ten percent inflation world, the taxrate relevant to own equity financing
would be 55%/38% of the marginal ratesshown in Table 2 or the tax—exemptrate,
whichever is less.
12. The methodology forcomputing these tax rates is discussed in Hendershott
and Ling (1986).
13. The model is both an extensionand simplification of that used by
Hendershott and Shilling (1982) toanalyze the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981. The extension is a more detailedtreatment of nonresidential capital;
the simplification is anexogenous specification of risk premia. Gravelle
(1985) uses a somewhat similar model to
analyze the Treasury plan. Fullerton
(1985) analyzes the impact of theTreasury plan on effective tax rates.
14. Higher interest rates pulled inforeign capital, but the dampening effect
of this inflow on rising interestrates is assumed to have been offsetby
increased Federal deficits.
15. Boswortj- (1985) makes theSomewhat contrary argument that business
investment in recent years is notconsistent with the passage of ERTA.
16. In simulations where theaggregatecapital stock was determined endogenously
as that consistent with the imposed 10percent interest rate, the total capital
stock falls by 15 percent in theTreasury simulation, 8 percent in the House—
Bill simulation, and 3 percent for theAdministration plan.—36—
17. This statement would seem to be at variance with the sharp shift to
homeownership in the 1970s. The latter occurred because interest rates did not
fully reflect expected general inflation and expected house price inflation
likely exceeded expected general inflation by 2 to 3 percentage points.
18. This is an understatement of the loss because it does not take into account
inefficiencies created by industry specific tax provisions or by tax—exempt
financing of private purpose activities. Moreover, the gains from removing
such inefficiences by, say, the Treasury plan are understated.
19. The loss is independent of the presumed risk premium associated with
owner—occupied housing (p—d— is independent of ) and is largely independent
of its presumed loan—to—value ratio (under current law an advantage of debt
financing exists only for high—income owners)—37—
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Table 1
Data on Ownership and Debt for Stock of Over—SO Unit Rental Properties
1960 1970 1980
% Ownership
Individuals 21 22 18
Partnerships 14 36 56
Rental Corporations 49 29 12
Other 6 3 4
Mortgaged Properties
% of Total Properties 90 93 92
Median Loan—to—Value Ratio 54 67 53
Properties with First Mortgage
(new or assumed) at Time of Purchase
% of Mortgaged Properties 57 71 81
Median Loan—to—Value Ratio 83 87 87
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Residential
Finance Sections of 1960, 1970 and 1980 Census of Housing.—41—
Table 2
Depreciation and Tax Credit Parameters
EquipmentPublic Util. IndustrialCommercialResidential 1980
%SL 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 Tax Life 11 21/30 37 37 32
Tax Credit .096 .10 0 0 0
1981—85
%SL 1.5 1.5
1"75b LOb Tax Life 5 10/15 15 15 15 Tax Credit 10a .10 0 0 0
Treasury
Depr. Rate .15(aver.) .08/.05 .03 .03 .03
Tax Life 5 to 24 24/38 63 63 63 Taxcredjt 0 0 0 0 0
Administration
%SL 1.62 1.54/1.7 1.12 1.12 1.12
Tax Life 6(aver.) 7/10 28 28 28 Taxcredjt 0 0 0 0 0
House Bill
%SL 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Tax Life 8(aver..) 20/30 30 30 30 Taxcredjt 0 0 0 0 0
aThe 1982 Tax Act reduced thedepreciable base by one—half the tax credit.
bThe 1984 Tax Act raisedthe life from 15 to 18 years, and the 1985 Act raised
it to 19.—42—
Table 3
Tax Rates and Deductibility Provisions
1980 1981—85 Treasury Adininistra— House
Corporate tion
Tax Rate
Federal (t ) .48 .46 .33 .33 .36
Total (t) .512 .4924 .37 .37 .3984
Personal
Tax Rates
Interest Income (t. )a .568 .53 .41 .41 .4172
Equity Income (t )lm .0795 .0742 .112
.0662 .0753
Tax Exempts (X)e .336 .322 .081 .231 .252
Tax on Inven— 70% of Reg— 70% of reg— 0 70% of re— 70% of reg—
tory Gains ular rate ular rate ular rate ular rate
Interest d Indexation No No Yes No No
Dividend 0 0 0.5 0.1 No
E5cclusion
Deductibility of
Property Taxes Full Full No No Full
aTh are the rates at which interest income is taxed (real interest under the
Treasury plan). The rate at which business (noncorporate) interest expense would be
deducted is lower under the Treasury and Administration plans, 0.389 owing to the
state and local offset at the Federal level.









cTaX was removed in original version but added later to achieve revenue neutrality.
dHOme mortgage interestexpense is not indexed.—43.-
Table 4
Tax Rates Relevant to Housing Decisions
1980 Income State and Federal Quantity—Demanded Tenure Choice
(thousands) Local Total Total
9—18½ .03 .16 .185 .132
(12½)
18½—22½ .035 .18 .209 .201
(20)
22½—37½ .04 .24 .270 .306
(30)
37½—75 .05 .37 .402 .435
(50)
over 75 .06 .49 .521 .565
(97½)
1985Income Federal Quantity—Demanded Tenure Choice
(thousands) Current Trea House CurrentTrea House Current Trea Adm House
&Adm &Adm
12½—25 .14 .15 .15 .166 .180 .176 .147 .119 .092 .071
(17½)
25—30 .16 .15 .15 .189 .185 .180 .210 .146 .130 .097
(27½)
30—50 .18/.22 .15 .15/.25 .232 .190 .232 .279 .178 .198 .208
(35 & 40)
50—100 .33 .25 .35 .364 .300 .383 .402 .300 .300 .383
(70)
over 100 .42 .35 .35 .455 .410 .389 .476 .410 .410 .404
(130)—44.-
Table S
Private Capital Stock in the U.S.
End 1983 Dollar Value Percent Share of Real Stock
(billions) 1980 1984




Corporate 1183 18.95 20.10 6.0
Noncorporate 269 4.26 4.40 3.0
Nonresidential Structures 1634





Industrial 546 7.85 7.92 0.9
(corporate)
Commercial 628 8.31 8.64 4.0
(noncorporate)





Sources: Data for all assets except inventories and public utilities are from
Musgrave (1984). The inventory data are from the Federal Reserve (1984); the
aggregate public utility data are from unpublished data supplied by John
Musgrave; and the 1/3, 2/3 division between 10 and 15 years are based on the
fraction given in Gravelle (1982).—45—
Table 6
Assumed Distribution of Owner and RentalHousing
Across Six Income Classes
Income HouseholdsFraction % of Income % of Housing Stock




less than 9 9.6 0 0 11 2.7
9—18½ 24 .577 12 22 7.6 4.9
18½—22½ 12 .625 11 15 7.1 3.6
22½—37½ 22.4 .707 34 34 24.3 7.9
37½—75 9.6 .813 28 15 23.9 3.6
over 75 2.4 .889 15 4 13.5 0.9
80 100 100 76.4 23.6
1985
less than 12½ 9.6 0 0 11 — 2.6
l2½—25 24 .631 14 17 9.4 4.6
25—30 12 .664 12 14 8.0 3.3
30—50 22.4 .703 33 33 23.9 8.0
50—100 9.6 .781 28 18 22.2 4.4
ove.r 100 2.4 .819 13 7 12.1 1.7
80 100 100 75.5 24.546—
Table 7
ERTA and Disinflation
1980 ERTA ERTA plus
Inflation Decline
Inflation Rate .08 .08 .05
Interest Rate .13 .1406 .0944
Real Capital
Inventories 12.79 12.68 —0.9 12.77 —0.2
Equipment 23.21 25.83 11.2 25.61 10.4
Nonresidential
Structures
Industrial 7.85 8.61 9.7 8.83 12.5
Public Util. 6.86 7.21 5.1 7.31 6.5
Commercial 8.31 8.56 3.0 8.19 —1.5
Residentia1 40.96 37.11 —9.5 37.28 —9.2
Structures _______ _______
100.00 100.00 100.00
Homeownership .589 .544 .585
Rate